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This paper studies the aggregate consequences of individual learning in the labor market.
Specically, I examine this issue in a model of directed search on the job. Once matched,
a rm-worker pair gradually learns the match-specic quality, taking the history of realized
production as signals. Heterogeneity in beliefs about the match quality and in the job
search behavior of workers naturally occurs, resulting from a variety of individual histories. I
describe the ecient learning and searching strategy and implement the ecient allocations
through a market mechanism in which the labor contract depends deterministically on tenure.
Consistent with the stylized facts, the model successfully predicts the tenure eect on both
the job separation rate and the probability of on-the-job search, and when search frictions
are small, the model generates a dispersed wage distribution with a 
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of observations.
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11 Introduction
It is well established that learning about the match quality of rm-worker pairs plays an
important role in explaining job turnover at the individual level.1 However, few studies have
shed light on the aggregate consequences resulting from individual learning. This paper analyzes
the impact of individual learning on wage dispersion, the interplay between learning and search
frictions, and how the socially ecient learning allocation can be implemented through a market
mechanism.
I develop a directed on-the-job search model to address the aforementioned issues. In particular,
I introduce the learning behavior of matched rm-worker pairs into a frictional labor market. A
rm and a worker may meet in the labor market. Their pair-specic match quality is initially
unknown (with the same prior on both sides) and revealed gradually over time. Employed workers
can search for a new job and so can unemployed workers, and the optimal search strategy depends
on a worker's subjective evaluation of his current job status. Over time, a worker adjusts his
evaluation of current job match quality based on his past job performance. The diversity of
individual histories results in ex post heterogeneity in subjective evaluation and therefore in the
job search behavior among workers. Optimistic workers are attracted by well-paying jobs only.
Pessimistic workers, who are or will be unemployed, are less selective and are willing to take oers
with lower pay. This job status contingent search strategy can generate interesting empirical
implications for both job turnover and wage dispersion.
In general, the equilibrium is hard to characterize. In a standard search model, as Burdett
and Mortenson (1998) and Shi (2009) show, rms may post dierent wage schemes, which induces
two dimensions of ex post heterogeneity among employed workers: (1) their subjective evaluation
of the current match quality, and (2) the wage scheme promised by their current employer. A
worker's job search behavior depends on both of them, and therefore it is hard to analyze, especially
in an equilibrium model. To avoid the curse of dimensionality, I follow Menzio and Shi (2011)
and consider an environment in which the employment contract is complete and the allocation is
socially ecient. Focusing on this particular environment not only simplies the analysis but also
generates interesting and economically relevant dynamics.
To characterize the socially ecient allocation, I start with the social planner's problem. A
social planner decides (1) the separation rule of existing matches and (2) search strategy for
each worker. The ecient separation rule is given as a cuto belief about match quality. When
the belief about match quality is higher than the cuto level, the planner keeps the underlying
1For example, Bergemann and Valimaki (1994), Eeckhout and Weng (2010), Felli and Harris (1996), Jovanovic
(1979), Miller (1984), Nagypal (2007).
2match. Otherwise, the planner destroys the match and naturally stops learning about its quality.
Following the literature of directed search (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Moen 1997), I assume
there are numerous locations in the economy. A match forms only if a worker meets a rm at the
same location. To workers, locations dier from each other in the probability of nding a new
job and promised pay. The ecient choice of a searching location is determined by the current
state of a worker. If an employed worker is in a good match, he does not search for a new job.
If an employed worker's current match quality is uncertain, he is sent to a specic location to
nd a new job, and the probability of getting a new job is non-increasing in the belief about his
current match quality. An unemployed worker searches for a job at the location with the highest
job-nding probability. Thanks to the block recursive structure of the model, the social planner's
solution does not depend on the distribution of workers' states, and therefore, the analysis works
whether it is at the steady state or not.
Next, for tractability, I take the original discrete time model to its continuous time limit to
characterize its approximated empirical implication. The discrete time model has a well-dened
continuous time limit, the solution of which is uniquely characterized by a set of equations. The
dynamics of the continuous time limit of the social planner's problem is governed by an ordinary
dierential equation. This implies that when the time interval is small, the solution to a social
planner's problem in discrete time can be approximated by the solution to a simple ODE.
I then turn to the decentralization of the planner's solution in both discrete time and continuous
time settings and suggest possible empirical implications of the market equilibrium. The planner's
solution can be implemented if a rm and a worker sign a bilaterally ecient contract upon forming
their match. In particular, a bilaterally ecient contract may consist of a contractible tenure
contingent on-the-job search strategy, a tenure independent wage agenda and a probationary
period. Under this specic contract, the market equilibrium can implement the socially ecient
allocation.
The main results are equilibrium predictions at both the individual and aggregate levels. First,
this model can preserve the qualitative correlations between tenure, separation rates, and on-the-
job search probability that are observed in the individual-level data. The separation rate as a
function of tenure rst increases at low tenure levels, then decreases, and eventually becomes
constant. The on-the-job search probability as a function of tenure is decreasing rst and constant
in the end. Second, at the aggregate level, this model generates a stationary wage distribution
whose curvature depends on learning speed and search frictions. With small search frictions, one
can expect a wage distribution with a 
at tail. Intuitively, when search frictions are small, it is easy
to nd a job quickly, and therefore it is socially inecient to create many vacancies for workers
whose match quality is believed to be not low enough. Since those workers are aiming for a high
3wage, the new match formation with a high wage has low mass. Hence, the probability densities
of high wage oers are small in the stationary wage distribution. Finally, a simple comparative
statics of this model reveals that the wage dispersion increases as a result of an improvement in
aggregate productivity. These empirical implications illustrate that the coexistence of individual
learning and search frictions has important aggregate consequences.
These theoretical results are roughly consistent with a variety of stylized facts emerging from
the data at both the micro and macro levels. For example, Farber (1994) and Nagypal (2007)
nd that the separation rate increases early in tenure and decreases later, but in the end, the
separation rate becomes constant. In addition, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) show that on-
the-job search intensity is decreasing in tenure. Finally, many empirical papers, such as Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002), and Mortenson (2005), nd that within-group wage dispersion has a 
at
tail, and its inequality rises from the 1970s to the 1990s as productivity improves. See Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009) for details.
My paper is closely related to Moscarini (2005), who also studies the aggregate consequences
of pair-specic match quality learning in a Mortenson-Pissarides model. In his paper, search is
random, and a matched worker and rm keep bargaining over wages over time. His model implies
that a low-quality match bears a higher probability of being destroyed than a high-quality match
does, and therefore, the longer a worker stays, the higher are the match quality he expects to
have. This ex post selection mechanism generates a tenure-wage eect and a wage dispersion with
a 
at tail. Although learning is the common driving force of both Moscarini' model and mine, the
mechanisms are very dierent and lead to dierent implications. In my paper, search is directed
and wage is determined by a contract posting mechanism instead of Nash bargaining. Moreover,
in Moscarini's model, the shape of the wage distribution results from the combination of an ex
post selection mechanism and a tenure eect; in my model, the wage dispersion is generated by
the combination of learning and on-the-job search. Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) consider a
random search model in which workers learn about the unknown distribution of wages from the
random arrival of wage oers and showed that learning from search can induce reservation wages
to decline with the duration of unemployment. Gonzalez and Shi (2010) also employ a directed
search framework to study learning issues. Yet, they focus on the learning of workers' job search
ability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic environment,
individual payo and learning process. The social planner's problem is characterized in Section 3.
Section 4 considers a simple contract to implement the social planner's allocation in a frictional
labor market and discusses the empirical implications. A number of extensions are discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All technical proofs can be found in the Appendices.
42 The Model
2.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and lasts forever with a time interval of  > 0. Denote T = 0;;2;:::
as the calender time of the economy. The economy is populated by a continuum of workers of
measure one and by a continuum of rms of measure greater than 1. Each worker has the utility
function
P1
T=0 e rTCT, where CT 2 R is the worker's consumption in [T;T + ) and r is his
discount rate. Each rm has the payo function
P1
T=0 e rTT, where T 2 R is the rm's
prot in [T;T +). Each rm has one vacancy and can hire at most one worker. Vacant rms or
unemployed workers are unproductive.
The match between a rm and a worker is either good or bad. If the match is good, a matched
rm receives 1 unit of payo in each period with probability ; if the match is bad, a matched rm
receives nothing. Initially, a matched worker-rm pair shares symmetric information about the
match quality with a common prior 0 2 (0;1) that the current match is good. They observe the
outcomes and hold common posterior beliefs t throughout time, where t denotes the subjective
probability that they assign to the match being good at t, where t denotes the worker's tenure
in his current job with t = 0;;2;3:::. For simplicity, no extra 
ow payo is generated by
a match. A match is destroyed exogenously with probability  in each period. Unemployed
workers enjoy a 
ow payo of b > 0, which can be interpreted as his home production. To avoid
a trivial case, assume 0 > b > 0, that is, a new match is better than no match, but no match
is better than a bad match.
There is a continuum of locations indexed by a real number l 2 [0;1]. A vacant rm and a
worker can match only if they are searching in the same location. In each period, both rms and
workers decide which location to enter. A location is interpreted as a submarket if there are rms
and workers there. Dierent submarkets can be indexed by the promised value to the worker,
x 2 R, posted by rms in that market. I denote mapping   : [0;1] ! R[? as the submarket
assignment function. In other words, x =  (l) is the promised value to the worker specied by
the contract oered at location l, while  (l) = ? means there is no submarket at location l. At
location l with  (l) 6= ?, the ratio between the number of jobs that are vacant and the number
of searching workers is denoted by ~ (l) 2 R+. I refer to (x) as the tightness of the submarket at
location l such that x =  (l). In other words, I do not distinguish between the two markets l 6= l0
with the same x.
All submarkets are frictional. In particular, workers and rms that are searching in the same
location are brought into contact by a meeting technology with constant returns to scale that
can be described in terms of the market tightness  2 R+. In particular, each period a worker
5nds a vacant job with probability p((l)) at location l, where (l) is the market tightness at
location l and function p : R+ ! [0;1] is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, which satises (i) p(0) = 0, (ii) lim
!0
p0() = 1, and (iii) lim!1 p() is bounded
by a nite number. Similarly, a vacancy meets a worker with probability q((l)) in location l
where q : R+ ! [0;1] is a twice continuously dierentiable, strictly decreasing function such that
q() = p()=, q(0) = 1 and lim!1 q() = 0. When a rm and a worker meet, a new match is
formed, and the worker's old match, if any, is destroyed.
Each rm chooses to enter at most one submarket by paying a maintaining cost k in each
period and posts an employment contract x, which is the promised value to the worker. All
workers, whether employed or unemployed, observe all available oers in the labor market and
choose one submarket to enter and search for a new job. Dierent wage dynamics are allowed
given the identical initial expected promise. In general, a worker's individual wage dynamics can
depend on both the aggregate market variables and the match-specic payo history.
2.2 Timing
Each period is divided into three stages: 1) separation, 2) search and matching, and 3) pro-
duction. At the separation stage, an existing match is destroyed with probability z 2 [;1]2;
which is chosen by the matched rm, where  > 0 measures the exogenous separation rate.3
At the search and matching stage, each potential vacant rm chooses whether to create a
vacancy and which submarket it enters. While the workers who lose their jobs in the separation
stage are not allowed to search immediately, the rest, both employed and unemployed, can search.
They observe all available oers in every submarket and choose whether and where to search for
a new job. When a worker and a vacancy meet, they match and sign the contract proposed by
the rm.
At the production stage, an unemployed worker produces b units of output. An employed
worker with a good match produces the reward 1 with probability , and those with a bad match
produce zero. Put dierently, no news is bad news. A matched rm and a worker learn the quality
of their match commonly by observing their past production outcome.
2Since I focus on the case where  is small, [;1] is nonempty. Similarly, p(), q() and  are strictly
less than 1 for any  and .
3Alternatively, one can denote ze 2 [0;1] as the probability that a match is endogenously destroyed conditional
on its not being destroyed by Nature, and dene the ex ante probability of being destroyed as z = +(1 )ze.
62.3 Learning Process
The learning process is summarized as follows. Denote H as the collection of all signal histories
for an existing match. fFtg1
t=0 is the ltration generated by all possible individual histories. The
subjective belief t is a Ft adapted stochastic process. As stated before, each new match starts
with the same initial belief 0.
For a match with  = 1, no belief adjustment happens regardless of its current period output.
For a match with   0, if the unit of payo is received in tenure period t, t+ jumps to 1;
otherwise, by standard Bayes' rule updating, the evolvement of t in each period follows
t+   t =
 t(1   t)
t(1   ) + (1   t)
:
When  goes to zero, one obtains the well-known limit _ t =  (1 t)t; which is 0 if t equals
either 0 or 1.
Denote B as the set of all possible values t based on the production history. For any  2 B,
dene   such that  =  +
  (1  )
 (1 )+(1  ), and + such that + = +
 (1 )
(1 )+(1 ). In other
words,   (+) is the last (next) period belief about the match with current belief . When 
goes to zero, the Hausdor distance between B and [0;0] [ f1g goes to zero.
3 Ecient Allocation
To characterize the ecient allocation, I solve the social planner's problem rst. The social
planner's search strategy and separation strategy depend both on the aggregate employment state
and on a worker's individual employment status. The former includes the unemployment rate
and the distribution of the current match quality. The latter includes: (1) whether the worker is
employed, and (2) the belief about the worker's match quality if he is employed. Formally, dene

 = [0;0] [ fug [ f1g as a worker's state space. A worker's state ! 2 
 can be interpreted
as follows. For an uncertain matched worker, his type ! 2 [0;0] is the belief about the current
match quality. For a matched worker who has sent a good signal before, ! = 1. For an unemployed
worker, ! = u. Denote the probability measure T as the state of the economy. Let  = (
)
denote the set to which T belongs for all T.
3.1 Formulation of the Planner's Problem
At each stage, the social planner decides on job creation, match formation and separation,
and workers' job search strategy. Formally, at the beginning of a period, the planner observes the
7aggregate state . At the separation stage, the planner chooses the probability z : [0;0][f1g !
[;1] of destroying a match for each belief . At the search and matching stage, the planner
observes the adjusted aggregate state and chooses how many vacancies to open at each location
and which location a worker should visit, and therefore he can determine (!), the tightness at the
location where workers with state ! look for new matches,  : 
 ! R+. As is standard in models
of directed search, the planner will nd it optimal to send workers with dierent states to dierent
locations but will have no incentive to send workers with the same states to dierent locations.
Thus, there is no loss in generality in indexing the active location by the state of workers ! who
are searching for new jobs there.
After the rst two stages, the economy's state change to ~  due to the job reallocations. To
compute the updated state of the economy ~ , it is useful to derive the transition probabilities for an
individual worker in the rst two stages. Suppose the planner's optimal separation probability is z
in the separation stage, then a matched worker with state  becomes unemployed with probability
z(); thus the increment of the measure of unemployed workers is
R
2[0;0][f1g zd, and the measure
of a match that survives with state  is ()(1   z()), assuming that the law of large numbers
holds in this environment.
At the search and matching stage, workers' state may change due to both unemployment-to-
employment and employment-to-employment transition. Suppose the planner's optimal search
policy is (!). In other words, he sends workers with state ! to a location where the tightness is
(!). First, consider a worker who enters this period unemployed. With probability 1 p((u)),
the worker does not meet a rm at this stage. In this case, the worker remains unemployed. With
probability p((u)), the worker meets a rm and becomes employed. Next, consider an employed
worker who enters this period with state  and survives the separation stage. With probability
1   p(()), the worker does not meet a rm at this stage and remains . With probability
p(()), the worker meets a rm and forms a new match. In this case, his state changes to 0.
After aggregating the transition probabilities of individual workers, the measure of workers
who are unemployed at the production stage is given by




while the measure of workers who are employed with state ! 2 B=f0g is given by
~ () = ()[1   z()](1   p(())): (2)
Similarly, the measure of workers with state 0 is given by





8where the rst term of the right-hand side is the measure of workers who enter this period with
state 0 and survive the separation stage, the second term is the measure of workers who enter
this period unemployed and nd a job in the search stage, and the last term is the measure of
workers who enter this period employed, survive the separation stage and change their job in the
search stage.
Clearly, there is no reason to separate a good match or replace it with another one, since there
is no way to generate a strictly positive surplus by replacing a good match; hence, the separation
and search policies for good matches are z(1;) =  and (1;) = 0 in any state of the economy
. Therefore, one can focus on the choice of (z();();(u)). Given the state of the economy 
and a choice function (z();(!)), the social planner's ex ante 









()[1   z()]d + (u)(u)];
where the rst and third terms are the expected 
ow payo created by existing matches, the
second term is unemployed workers' benets, the last term is the sum of new contract posting
costs in all locations, and ~  can be calculated by (1,2,3).
At the production stage, the economy's state changes to ^  due to learning of uncertain matches.
For a worker whose state is ! 2 f1;ug, there is nothing to learn; thus his state will be unchanged
regardless of his output in the production stage. For a worker whose state is  2 B=f1g, his
state will change at the production stage for sure. With probability , his state becomes ! = 1
if a breakthrough is realized; with complementary probability, his state becomes ! = + if no
breakthrough is realized. After aggregating the transition probabilities of individual workers at
the production stage, the economy's state becomes




^ (u) = ~ (u); ^ (0) = 0; and





where ~  is given by (1,2,3). In sum, the planner's decisions imply that next period's distribution
of workers' state ^ () is given by








()[1   z()](1   p(())) if   2 B=(f1g [ f0g);
(1   0)f(0)[1   z(0)] + p((u))(u)
+
R
2[0;0] p(())[1   z()]dg if   = 0;
(6)
^ (0) = 0; and (7)
^ (1) = (1)[1   ] +
Z
2[0;0)
[1   z()](1   p(()))d() (8)





=(B [ fug)) = 0 in any period.
The planner maximizes the sum of the present value of the discounted 
ow payo at rate r.







subject to (5-8), and z : 
 ! [;1]; : 
 ! R+.
In general, the optimal policies depend on both  and !. Following Menzio and Shi (2011),
Lemma 1 shows that the social planner's society problem is separable, that is, the search and
learning strategy of a worker depend only on his own state instead of the distribution .
Lemma 1. The planner's value function U
 is the unique solution to (9) such that (5-8), and
satises the following properties:
1. U
 is linear in . That is, U
() = (u)S (u)+(1)S(1)+
R
2[0;0] S()d, where the
component value function S (u) is given by
S
 (u) = max

















 (u)] + (1   z)f[1   p()][1 + e
 rS
(1)] (11)











The component value function S(1) is given by
S
(1) = [b + e
 rS
 (u)] + (1   )f + e
 rS
(1)g: (12)
102. The policy functions 
 , z
 do not depend on the distribution .
3. S() is strictly increasing in .
Thanks to Lemma 1, one can solve the planner's society problem (9) by nding the solution
of the planner's individual worker problem, S(!) for ! 2 B [fug, with U
 () being given by
their -weighted sum. In the planner's individual worker problem associated with an unemployed
worker, the planner chooses (u) to maximize the present value of the output generated by this
worker, net of the cost of vacancies assigned to him. Similarly, in the planner's individual worker
problem associated with a worker with state , the planner chooses z();() to maximize the
present value of the output generated by this worker, net of the cost of the vacancies assigned to
him. That the planner's society problem can be decomposed into countablely many individual
worker problems results from the fact that the search process is directed rather than random.
Under random search, the planner has to choose the same tightness for workers with dierent
states because all workers search in the same location; thus, the planner's society problem cannot
be decomposed into worker-state-specic individual problems, and the solution will depend on the
current state of the economy, .
3.2 Solution to the Planner's Problem
As I argued, it is suboptimal to separate a good match, and the ecient choice of z
 (1) = ,

 (1) = 0. The ecient search choice for an unemployed worker is 




 (u))f0[1 + e
 rS




0 )   b   e
 rS
(u)g: (13)
The left-hand side of (13) is the marginal cost of increasing the tightness at the location for
unemployed workers. The right-hand side is the marginal benet, which is given by the product
of two terms. The rst term is the marginal increase in the probability of workers' state transition
from unemployed to 0. The second term is the state transition surplus, which is given by the
expected value dierence between the new state and the current state. The existence of an interior
solution depends on (1) the Inada conditions of p(), and (2) the second term of the right-hand
side is strictly positive. Hence 
 (u) > 0.






 ())f0[1 + e
 rS











11Notice that the second term of the RHS of (14) is strictly increasing in ; thus 
 () is strictly
decreasing in . Since p() satises the Inada conditions, 
 () > 0 when  < 0, and 
 () = 0
when  2 f0;1g.
Finally, since the social planner's -specic problem is linear in z, the ecient choice for the
separation probability is z
 () = 1 if
b + e
 rS
(u)  [1   p()][1 + e
 rS
(1)] (15)












 () =  otherwise. The left-hand side of (15) is the value induced by separating the
current match. The worker becomes unemployed but does not have the opportunity to search
for a new match in the current period. The right-hand side is the value induced by keeping the
current match. When the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side, the planner destroys
the current match for sure. Otherwise, Nature destroys the match with probability . Notice
that the left-hand side does not depend on , but the right-hand side is strictly increasing in ;
thus the solution can be summarized by a stopping belief 





1 if   
 ;
 if  > 
 ;
for all  2 B. Combining (13), (14) and S (u)  S() for any  2 [
 ;0] [ f1g yields that

 (u)  
 () for all  2 (
 ;0].
The properties of the socially ecient search and separation rule are summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. The policy correspondences (z
 ;
 ) satisfy the following properties:
1. They are singleton valued, i.e., they are functions.
2. There is 
 such that, for any  2 B, z
 () = 1 if   
 and z
 () =  if  > 
 .
3. S (u)  S() for any  2 [
 ;0] [ f1g.
4. The search strategy 
 (1) = 
 (0) = 0;
 (u) > 0, 
 () > 0 for any  2 B=(f1g[f0g),
and 
 () is decreasing and smaller than 
 (u) for all  2 (
 ;0].
It is worth noting that the block recursivity of the planner's problem does not imply that the
social planner's value is irrelevant to the distribution. First, it is clear that the social planner's
choice aects the workers' state transition and therefore ^ . Second, the measure of job creation
depends on . For example, the measure of vacancy created for unemployed workers is v() =

 (u)(u). When the unemployment rate (u) is high, the measure of vacancy in the submarket
for unemployed workers v() would also be high even though 
 (u) does not depend on (u).
123.3 Continuous Time Limit
The problem (10,11,12) has no closed-form solution, and therefore, its empirical implications
are dicult to characterize. I examine a continuous time limit of the model obtained by taking
the length of each period to zero. In the limit, for an unemployed worker, a new job arrives as a
Poisson process whose rate depends on the tightness in the market where the worker is searching.
For an existing match, a good signal arrives with a rate either  or 0; which depends on the match
quality, and the exogenous separation arrives with a rate . The planner chooses an optimal
stopping belief such that an existing match is destroyed when its match quality is lower than this
cuto belief. For each ! 2 
, one can solve the associated value S(!) and policy function (!),
which is the analogue of S(!) and 
 (!) in the discrete time model, and solve the planner's
aggregate payo by simply calculating an integral,
R
!2
 S(!)d. As I will show, both S() and
() are dierentiable; thus, the empirical implications of the continuous time model can be easily
derived.
Note that the value and strategy, S (!) and (!), are the solution of the continuous time
planner's individual worker problem, whose formal expression is relegated to Appendix A. The
continuous time version of planner's society problem involves consideration of innite-dimensional
states, T, and complicated resulting dynamics. The proof of the separability of the planner's
problem is dicult to work with, which is dierent from that in the discrete time model in Menzio
and Shi (2011). The goal of taking the limit is to approximate the equilibrium dynamics in the
original discrete time model when  is small and to obtain tractability of the equilibrium strategy,
(!), and its implications. I characterize the solution of the planner's individual worker problem
in continuous time in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. The solution of the planner's problem in continuous time satises the following Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations:
rS (u) = b + p((u))[S(0)   S (u)]   k(u); (16)
where
k = p
0((u))[S(0)   S (u)]; (17)
when ! = u;
rS(1) =  + [S (u)   S(1)]; (18)
when ! = 1;
S() = S (u); (19)
13when ! 2 [0;),
rS() =  + (S(1)   S())   (1   )S
0() (20)
+(S (u)   S()) + p(())[S(0)   S()]   k();
where
k = p
0(())[S(0)   S()] for ! 2 (;0);and (0) = 0; (21)
with boundary conditions
S (u) = S();S
0() = 0 ; (22)
when ! 2 [;0]:
The proof is omitted since it follows the standard verication argument, which can be found
in chapter 4 of Oksendal and Sulem (2005). The following Proposition shows that the solution of
the social planner's discrete time problem can be approximated by equations (16{21) when the
time interval between consecutive periods is small enough.
Proposition 1. As  goes to zero, the planner's value function S(!) in the discrete time model
converges uniformly to S(!) on 
, where S(!) is the solution of (16{21). The policy function

 (!) converges uniformly to the policy function (!) when ! 6= 1, and 0 when ! = 1, the optimal
stopping belief 
 converges uniformly to .
I present an intuitive argument here, and relegate the proof to the Appendix A. To show that
S(!) ! S(!), one needs to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the limit solution, S(!). The
following Lemma characterizes the properties of the solution of problem (16{21).
Lemma 4. The solution of (16{21) exists and satises the following properties:
1. It is unique.
2. S() is increasing for all  2 [;0], () is decreasing for all  2 [;0].
3. S() is convex for all  2 [;0].
After characterizing the properties of the limit S(!), one can show the convergence step by
step.
Policy function. First, look at the policy function 
 (!) associated with S(!) for ! 2
(
 ;0] [ fug. For an unemployed worker, notice that the second term of the right-hand side of




0 )   S
 (u)   0[1 + e
 rS
(1)]   (0 + r)S
(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0   0) where 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0  0 is nite,
when  goes to zero, the right-hand side of (13) goes to p0(
 (u))[S(0)   S (u)]. Since the







when  is close to zero.
Similarly, for an employed worker with belief  2 (







when  is close to zero. For 0-worker, 
 (0) = 0, since there is no surplus from job replacement.
Value function. Then consider the value function S(!). For an unemployed worker, (10) can
be reformulated as
S
 (u) = b + e
 rS





 (u) + O()]   kg;
where the optimal 
 (u) can be approximated by 0
(u), which satises (23). Hence, together with
1   r as an approximation to e r, S (u) can be approximated by
b   k + (1   r)S




 (u)] + O(
2):
By taking  to zero and ignoring the O() term, one obtains
rS







Similarly, for an employed worker with belief  2 (
 ;0], S() can be approximated by
b
2 + (1   r)S
 (u) + (1   )f + (1   r)S
(1)
+(1   )(1   r)S
(








and lim!0 S(+) = S()+lim!0
S(+) S()
+  (+ ) = S() (1 )S0(). Hence, by taking
 to zero, one obtains
rS
0() =  + (S
0(1)   S












By the same logic, rS0(1) = +[S0 (u) S0(1)]. It is clear that S0(!) for any ! 2 
 satisfying
(16,18,19,20) and 0
(!) for any ! 2 [;0] [ fug satisfying (17,21).
15Boundary condition. Finally, consider the limit of the optimal stopping belief. 
 such that
S()  S (u) when   
 and S() < S (u) when  < 
 . Hence, S(
 ) = S (u) due
to the continuity of the value function. By taking  to zero, one obtains S0(0
) = S0 (u), where 0

is the accumulated point of 
 . In the optimal stopping literature, it is called the value-matching
condition.
Another boundary condition, smooth-pasting conditions, is also necessary to determine the
optimal stopping belief when  goes to zero. To see why, consider a deviation by stopping at
+
 instead of 
 . Let S(j) be the value at  by adopting stopping belief . Then the value









































 )]g + O(
2);
which is O(2), and therefore S0(0+









= 0. Similarly, one can
verify that S0(0 
 ) = 0 by considering the value dierence induced by stopping at  
 and 
 .
Hence, when  goes to zero, the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions hold at  = 0
.
In sum, S0(!) satises (16,18,19,20), 0
(!) satises (17,21), and 0
 satises (22). It is worth
mentioning here the possibility that on-the-job search improves the social value of learning because
() = 0 is always a (suboptimal) choice for any ! 2 
.
Remark 1. When p() = minf;1g; there are no search frictions in the market, and the on-the-
job search decision problem is a linear programming problem with a corner solution: () = 1 if
S(0)   S() > k,  = 0 otherwise.
Remark 2. When the match quality is known, 0 = 1,4 theabsence of learning implies that
matched workers' and rms' values are constant over time and on-the-job search is not ecient.
Hence, there is only one active submarket in the social planner's solution.
The intuition of the two remarks above is straightforward. The social planner's fundamental
trade-o is between the replacement premium of an existing match and cost of creating a vacancy.
When match quality is common knowledge, neither learning nor on-the-job search has value;
hence, the optimal allocation is a corner solution. When the market is non-linearly frictionless,
the fundamental trade-o becomes a linear programming problem, and distinguishing a match
with a dierent belief is not necessary. Hence, the optimal allocation is a corner solution as well.
4In order to avoid a trivial result, assume the publicly known match quality is greater than b.
164 Decentralization
In this section, I consider the implementation of the social planer's solution. I rst describe
the structure of the labor market and the nature of the employment contracts. I then derive the
conditions on the rms and workers' value and policy functions that need to be satised in the
market equilibrium. I also establish that there exists a unique equilibrium for the market economy
and that this equilibrium is ecient, in the sense that it decentralizes the solution to the planners'
problem, and block recursive, in the sense that the individual's value and policy functions depend
only on his own state. Finally, I derive some empirical implications of the market economy.
I assume that the contracts oered by rms to workers are bilaterally ecient in the sense that
they maximize the joint value of the match, that is, the sum of the worker's expected lifetime utility
and the rm's expected lifetime prots. I make this assumption because there are a variety of
specications of the contract space under which the contracts that maximize the rm's prots are,
in fact, bilaterally ecient. As I will show, the prot-maximizing contracts are bilaterally ecient
if the contract space is complete in the sense that a contract can specify the tenure independent
wage, w, the separation probability z and the worker's on-the-job search strategy. This result is
intuitive. The rm maximizes its prots by choosing the contingencies z;x so as to maximize the
joint value of the match and by choosing the contingencies for w so as to deliver the promised
value x.5
4.1 Market Equilibrium
In order to decentralize the social planner's optimal allocation, I rst dene the joint surplus
of an existing match M(!;) for ! 2 B [ fug. Note that M(!;) is not the social surplus
generated by the match since the matched worker and rm do not take into account the wage
posting cost paid by the worker's potential new employer.
Labor market supply side. First, consider an employed worker at the beginning of the search and
matching stage. Since the contract is bilaterally ecient, given the equilibrium market tightness
function (x;), the worker chooses to search in the submarket with promised value x to maximize
5Moreover, one can prove that the prot-maximizing contracts are bilaterally ecient if they can specify the
wage only as a function of tenure and productivity (while the separation and search decisions are made by the
worker). This result is also intuitive. The rm maximizes its prots by choosing the wage when it meets a worker
so as to deliver the promised value x and by choosing the wage as a function of the belief about the match so as
to induce the worker to maximize the joint value of the match (by setting the wage equal to the product of the
match). Alternatively, prot-maximizing contracts are bilaterally ecient if they can specify severance transfers
that induce the worker to internalize the eect of his separation and search decisions on the prots of the rm. See
Moen and Rosen (2004), and Menzio and Shi (2009, 2011) for more examples.
17the continuation value of his current match, which is given by
p((x;))x + [1   p((x;))]f[1 + e
 rM




With probability p(), the worker may nd a new job and obtains a value x and the rm obtain
zero, while with a complementary probability the current match survives and it may send a good
signal with a subjective probability .
At the separation stage, the employer predicts the worker's choice and chooses the separation
probability zd 2 [;1] to maximize the value of their match. Hence, their joint value is given by
M
(;) = max
z;x z[b + e
 rM
(u;)] (25)
+(1   z)f[1   p((x;))][1 + e
 rM
(1;)]




If the match is separated following the contract, the rm obtains zero and the worker becomes
unemployed. Otherwise, the worker follows the contract to search and maximize the continuation
value of his current match.
By the same logic, an unemployed worker chooses to search in the submarket with promised
value x to maximize his value, which is given by
M
(u;) = max
x f[1   p((x;))][b + e
 rM
(u;)] + p((x;))xg; (26)
where the interpretation of the Bellman equation is similar to the one above.
Clearly, given a bilaterally ecient contract, an employed worker with state 1 will choose not
to search in any submarket; thus his value is given by
M
(1;) = [b + e
 rM
(u;)] + (1   )f + e
 rM
(1;)g; (27)
and x(1;) = ? and z(1;) = :
Labor market demand side. Firms without a match are on the demand side of the labor market.
They choose whether to enter the labor market and which submarket to enter. The competition in
the labor market implies that rms' expected discounted prot is zero, and there is no dierence
between any of the submarkets for any rm. A rm may form a new match with probability








0 ;)   x:
By posting a new job, a rm needs to pay a 








0 ;)   x = k=q() = k=p(); (28)
18which pins down the equilibrium market tightness function (x;).
The solution concept I used is the bilaterally ecient recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE)
in which a matched rm and worker maximize their joint value.
Denition 1. A (bilaterally ecient) recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE, henceforth) consists
of a market tightness function 
d : R   ! R+, where 
d (x;) is the market tightness of a
submarket with promised value x in aggregate state , a value for the unemployed worker M(u;),
and an optimal submarket choice x
d (u;) 2 R [ ?, a joint value for the rm-worker match
M : B   ! R+, and policy functions for the rm-worker match z
d : B   ! [;1]
and x
d : B   ! R [ ?. These functions satisfy the following conditions: (i) 
d satises
(28) for all (x;) 2 R  ; (ii) M(u;) satises (26) for all  2 , and x
d (u;) 2 R is the
associated policy function, (iii) M(1;) satises (27) for all , and M(;) satises (25) for
all (;) 2 (0;0]  , and z
d (!;) and x
d (!;) are the associated policy functions.
Condition (i) guarantees that the market tightness function  is consistent with the rm's in-
centives to create vacancies. Condition (ii) guarantees that the search strategy of an unemployed
worker maximizes his lifetime utility, given the market tightness function. Condition (iii) guar-
antees that the matched rms and workers maximize their joint value. In general, workers' and
rms' equilibrium strategies depend on both their individual states and the state of the economy,
which is a distribution over 
. Fortunately, following Menzio and Shi (2011), it can be shown that
all bilaterally ecient recursive competitive equilibria satisfy the block recursive property in the
sense that all rms' and workers' equilibrium strategy depend on their individual states only.
Denition 2. A (bilaterally ecient) block recursive equilibrium (BRE, henceforth) consists of
a market tightness function 
d : R ! R+, where 
d (x) is the market tightness of a submarket
with promised value x, a value for the unemployed worker M
u , and an optimal submarket choice
x
d (u) 2 R [ ?, a joint value for the rm-worker match M : B ! R+, and policy functions
for the rm-worker match z
d : B ! [;1] and x
d : B ! R [ ?. These functions satisfy the
following conditions: (i) 
d satises (28) for all (x;) 2 R; (ii) M(u) satises (26) for all
 2 , and x
d (u) 2 R is the associate policy. (iii) M(1) satises (27) for all , and M()
satises (25) for all (;) 2 (0;0], and z
d () and x
d () are the associated policy functions.
The interpretation of three equilibrium conditions are similar to those in RCE. Taken together,
they ensure that in a BRE, the strategies of each agent are optimal given the strategies of the
other agents. The only dierence between a BRE and a standard RCE is that the individual
decision does not depend on market distribution .
Proposition 2. Suppose rms and workers can sign bilaterally ecient contracts. Then
191. All bilaterally ecient RCEs are block recursive.
2. There exists a unique BRE.
3. The BRE is socially ecient.
The proof of the rst statement is omitted since it is similar to the argument of theorem 2 in
Menzio and Shi (2011). Since the problems (25,26,27,28) are equivalent to the problems (10,11,12),
the existence, uniqueness and eciency of the equilibrium can be ensured. Since M(!) = S(!)
for any  > 0, M(!) converges to M(!) = S(!) as S(!) does.
Corollary 1. As  goes to zero,
1. The value function M(!) converges uniformly to the unique solution S(!) on 
, where
S(!) is given by (16-20).
2. The equilibrium 
d  x
d (!) uniformly converges to (!) dened in Lemma 3 for ! 2 
.
3. The equilibrium 
d (x) uniformly converges to a strictly decreasing and dierentiable function
d(x) such that
k = q(d(x))[S(0)   x]
4. The equilibrium x




x p((x))[S(0)   S(!)]   k(x)
5. The equilibrium stopping belief 
d induced by z
d uniformly converges to .
The block recursivity of the competitive equilibrium crucially depends on the fact that search
is directed. If one replaced the assumption of directed search with random search, the equilibrium
could not be block recursive. Under random search, workers with dierent beliefs all have to
search in the same market. When this is the case, the rms' expected value from meeting a worker
depends on how employed workers are distributed across dierent beliefs about their current match
quality, as this distribution determines the probability that the employment contract oered by
the rm will be accepted by a randomly selected worker. In turn, the free-entry condition implies
that the probability that a rm meets a worker must also depend on the distribution of workers.
Since the meeting probability between rms and workers depends on the distribution, so do all
the agents' value and policy functions.
204.2 Empirical Implications of Continuous Time Limit
In section 4.1, I show that when matched workers and rms make the decision to maximize
their joint value M(), the market equilibrium is equivalent to the social planner's problem.
However, how can the allocation above be implemented by a contract? In this section, I will
provide one contract that can induce the bilateral ecient allocation and characterize its empirical
implications.
Consider that workers and rms can contract C = (wc;c;xc) 2 R  [0;0]  (R [ ?), where
there is (1) a tenure independent 
ow wage wc, (2) the separation cuto belief c, (3) and the
worker's on-the-job search strategy xc(). Denote J(jC), V (jC) as the matched rm's and
worker's value when the belief about their match is , and the wage is wc.
Since utility is perfectly transferable between rm and worker, the rm's optimal contract in
market (;x) maximizes its expected life time prot such that the worker's expected life time
utility is not less than x.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the prot-maximizing contract C is given by (w;;x()), where
1. the wage clause, w = W(x); species the worker's 
ow wage during the current match, where
W is strictly increasing in the promised value x and such that V (0;W(x)) = x.
2. the stopping belief clause, ; species the match separation criteria, which satises the
requirement in Proposition 1, and
3. the on-job-search clause, x(); species the submarket the -worker should target, and sat-
ises d  x() = () where d(x) and () are given by Corollary 1 and Proposition
1.
A tenure-contingent on-the-job search strategy will internalize the externality of on-the-job
search costs and ring decisions at each belief level; thus, it is not surprising that the contract
implemented is bilaterally ecient. Since utility is transferable, the dierent constant wage dis-
tributes the joint value between matched rms and workers dierently. Since there is a one-to-one
map between x and wage, multiple wages appear in equilibrium in the discrete time model. In
the continuous time limit, the belief updates continuously and so does the target submarket wage.
Hence, the equilibrium wage set is connected.
Corollary 2. There exists a strictly increasing and dierentiable function wnew : (;0)[fug !
R such that
w
new = W  x
:
21This result is immediate given Corollary 1 and Proposition 3, and the strictly monotonicity
and dierentiability of wnew () results from those of W and x. It says that if a worker with state
! forms a new match, he gets a unique wnew (!) as his new wage level. In particular, consider an
employed worker with a wage w and an employment state, ! =  2 (;0), it must be that he
actively searches for other jobs. If this worker with (w;) gets a new job, then his new wage level
will be given by wnew (), which depends solely on , but not on his previous wage level w. This
will be useful when examining the stationary wage distribution.
4.2.1 Job Turnover
At the micro-level, it has been well established that (1) on-the-job search probability is de-
creasing in tenure, and (2) the separation rate is a function of tenure, which is increasing at rst,
then decreasing, and eventually becomes constant. The relevant literature can be traced back to
Parsons (1972), who nds a negative correlation between match quality and the separation rate.
Later, Farber (1994) nds the initially positive and soon negative relation between a worker's
tenure and the separation rate. Parsons (1991) and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) nd a neg-
ative relation between tenure and the propensity to search on the job. See a survey by Farber
(1999) for more details. A more recent work, Nagypal (2007), nds that learning on match quality
is the main driving force of the dynamics of separation rates. My model has predictions that are in
line with these stylized facts at the individual level, especially the on-the-job search (OJS) prob-
ability, the employment-to-employment transition (EE) rate, the employment to unemployment
transition rate (EU) and sthe eparation rate. The macro-level predictions on wage distribution
will be derived in section 4.2.2.
The driving force of the employment dynamics in this mechanism is learning and updating
beliefs about match qualities. A specic match is either good for sure or still has unknown quality.
For a good match, there is no on-the-job search, and job destruction happens only exogenously. If
the match quality is uncertain, the belief is less favorable as t increases, and consequently, search
intensity while on the job is higher, as well as the EE rate. Endogenous job destruction nally
takes place when the belief becomes "unbearable."
OJS Probability. Consider a randomly picked worker with tenure t. Without knowing his
signal history, one does not know for sure whether this match is good or whether this worker is
searching on the job. Nonetheless, it is possible to nd the ex ante probability that a randomly
chosen worker is searching on the job, as a function of t, which is
t 
(




22where  is a random variable representing the time at which the good signal occurs, so the
probability that it has not happened by t is Pr( > t) = exp( t), which is decreasing in t. The
critical time cuto is dened as t = infft > 0j0    =
R t
0 s(1   s)dsg, at which point
the belief hits  and the rm optimally destroys the current uncertain match, so the worker
becomes unemployed. Before this point, a match is bad with ex ante probability 1   0, and the
worker always searches for a new job. With complementary probability a0, the match is good,
and the worker searches only when a good signal has not arrived; hence, the quality remains
uncertain. Therefore, the model predicts that the on-the-job search intensity measured as the ex
ante probability is at rst decreasing in workers' tenure but eventually becomes constant.
EE Transition. The employment-to-employment transition rate is dened as the probability





The EE transition happens only if a worker is looking for another job. Conditional on that, the
probability that he actually nds a new job is p((t)). The tenure eect on ee
t is driven by two











The rst one is that conditional on the match not having sent a good signal before, the matched
worker becomes more pessimistic over time, and therefore, his on-the-job search becomes more
aggressive. Thus the probability of getting a new job becomes greater, and this raises the EE
rate. The second one that lowers the EE rate is simply the decreasing probability of a good match
not having sent a good signal. When t is small, by assumption of the matching function, p0()
is large, so the rst force dominates the second. As t approaches t,  goes to , and 0 goes
to zero because of the convexity of S(), which implies that the eect of the rst force goes to
zero. Hence, the second one becomes dominant. Yet, if a random match's tenure is greater than
t, only the good match can survive, in which case the EE transition rate is zero. To summarize,
the expected EE transition rate is initially increasing, then decreasing, and becomes negligible in
the long run.
EU Transition. The employment-to-unemployment transition rate as a function of tenure is
eu
t =  for any t 6= t, when the EU transition happens only as a result of exogenous separation.
At t = t, in addition to exogenous separations, all matches that did not send a good signal will be
endogenously destroyed, the measure of which is positive. The atom of EU rate results from the
assumption of a precise and uniform learning process. If the learning process is heterogeneous as a
23consequence of either dierent priors or noisy observations, such an atom can be eliminated. The
mass point in EU hazard showing at a particular tenure point is considered empirically irrelevant.
However, it ts the observation in the academic job market, where learning is based on relatively
uniform and precise information on the quality and quantity of research publications.
Separation Rate. Separation of an existing match may result from either EE or EU transi-
tion, hence the separation rate of an existing match with tenure t, t must be t = ee
t +eu
t . When
t < t, it is given by
t  0fPr( > t)[p((t)) + ] + Pr(  t)g + (1   0)[p((t)) + ]:
For a match with tenure t < t, the quality can be either good or bad, and tenure has two opposing
eects on the separation probability, which are,
_ t = p
0






Generically, t = ee
t + , the economic intuition behind _ t is almost identical to that of the EE
rate.
Consider a match with t > t, then this match must be good for sure and separation occurs
only as exogenous destruction at rate . Accordingly, the tenure eect _ t is zero. At t = t, as
discussed before, a positive measure of matches will be separated. Just as that of EU hazard, this
mass point of separation hazard at t is also empirically irrelevant. In summary, the expected
separation rate has a shape similar to that of the EE rate, which is also increasing at rst, then
decreasing, and eventually becomes constant.
4.2.2 Stationary Wage Distribution
Now I turn to the model's macro-level predictions on employment dynamics, which are in
line with another set of empirical ndings. Specically, I look at the wage dispersion. The
equilibrium search and learning strategy, (;), implies that a worker's state ! (T) follows a
continuous time Markov process, which is right continuous with respect to calendar time. Let

 = fug [ f1g [ [;0] denote the state space of ! (T) in the equilibrium. It is clear that the
process is aperiodic, strongly recurrent, and ergodic. In a large labor market with a continuum
population of workers, by assuming "the law of large number" holds, the invariant distribution,
if it exists, can be interpreted as the stationary cross-sectional distribution of workers' state. In
particular, the following Proposition shows that the market equilibrium has the unique stationary
wage distribution  : There are two mass points at ! = 1 and ! = u. For ! 2 [;0], the
probability density function is well dened. Denote the p.d.f. of stationary belief distribution as
24() for  2 [;0],  = (1) the probability mass at ! = 1, and  = (u) at ! = u. Since
the policy functions of matched workers and rms do not depend on wages, the evolution and
hence the stationary distribution of beliefs are identical for dierent wages. These ndings can be
summarized in the following Proposition.







for  2 [;0];
the probability density function () is given by
() = ()=A for  2 (;0]; (29)
() = 0, (30)

































In equilibrium, all matched pairs with the same  exhibit the same behavior in job searching,
separation and new match formation, regardless of dierent current wages. At each time, the in
ow
at each w is the rate at which new matches are formed with contracted wage w = wnew (!), ! 2 
,
and with the same prior belief 0. By Corollary 2, new matches formed with w come from two
sources, the unemployed workers if w = wnew (u), and employed workers with  = (wnew)
 1 (w).
Meanwhile, the out
ow is determined by integrating all rates at which matches with wage w and
dierent beliefs  2 (;0) [ f1g are destroyed. Stationarity requires in
ow and out
ow to be
equal at all wages w. And because of an identical belief distribution for every w, the out
ow rates
are in fact the same for all wages. Consequently, the shape of the stationary wage distribution can
be captured by the wage distribution of newly formed matches with (w;0) as there is a one-to-one
mapping between the new wage and the belief about the quality of the previous match, again by
Corollary 2. The measure of new matches is ()p(()), where  is the belief about the quality
of the previous match, the denominator is the total measure of new matches, and the numerator
is the probability that a worker with  gets a new job. The following Proposition summarizes the
intuition above.
25Proposition 5. The stationary wage measure, G
w(w), satises the following properties
1. It has a bounded and connected support [w;  w), where w = wnew(u) = lim& wnew(), and
 w = lim%0 wnew();
2. G
w(w) = gu
w > 0, and G
w(w) = 0 for all w 2 (w;  w);and
3. For w 2 (w;  w), the p.d.f. gw(w) =
dG
w(w)
dw is well dened and given by
gw(w) =
((wnew) 1(w))p((wnew) 1(w)) R 0
 (s)[p((s)) + ]ds + 1=A
:
For w = w, there is a mass point with measure gu





 (s)[p((s)) + ]ds + 1=A
:
The rst part directly results from Proposition 4 and Corollary 2. The second part is obtained
by making in
ow equal out
ow for all w 2 [w;  w).
Since
R 0











with 0 > 0 and 0 < 0. The rst term 0p is the separation eect due to both endogenous
and exogenous separation of current matches. When  ! 0, the separation rate is small, and
therefore the separation eect is bounded. The second term p00() is the search eect due to
the change in search behavior. In particular, employed workers adjust their target submarkets of
on-the-job search according to the change in : the smaller an , the bigger a probability of EE
transition. Hence, the second term is non-increasing in . When  ! 0, we have () ! 0,
and p0 ! 1, and therefore the second term goes to innity, while the rst eect remains nite.
Therefore, the search eect may dominate the separation eect when  is close to 0, and the
whole term becomes negative.
When the friction in the labor market is small enough, one can obtain a wage distribution
with a 
at tail, which is consistent with robust empirical ndings in the literature.6 For intuition,
consider a labor market with a Cobb-Douglas matching function p() = 
 where 
 2 [0;1]. The
planner maximizes the social gain from on-the-job search of employed workers, max 
[S(0)  




26which depends on both 
 and S(0)   S(). Higher  leads to a smaller surplus of replacement
S(0)   S(), and therefore, fewer vacancies are created. Smaller search frictions (large 
) also
lead to fewer vacancies being created. In the decentralized labor market, a low job-nding rate for
high  workers implies a small measure of high wage oers, and therefore, the mass of high-wage
jobs is relatively small in the stationary wage distribution. When search frictions are small (

close to 1), the planner does not create many vacancies unless  is small enough, () is small for
large . By Proposition 4 and Corollary 2, w = wnew (()) has a small mass when  is large, but
a large mass when  is small. Hence, the stationary wage distribution has a 
at tail.
Related stylized facts in the macro-labor literature are summarized in Mortenson (2005). On
the theoretical side, this 
at tail has been attributed to multiple-job applications (Galenianos and
Kircher, 2009), on-the-job training (Fu, 2011), a combination of ex post selection and tenure eect
(Moscarini, 2005), etc. However, in this paper, it is the coexistence of match quality learning and
on-the-job search frictions that generates the wage dispersion. On the one hand, without search
frictions, there is only one submarket; hence, the market wage distribution is degenerated even
though there is a non-trivial learning process about match quality. On the other hand, if the match
quality is deterministic, then there is no need for learning, and naturally no ex post heterogeneity
among workers, so the wage dispersion disappears as well. Therefore, it is the interaction between
the two attributes that leads to the dierence in wages. It would be interesting to empirically
decompose the eect of search frictions and the eect of learning in a directed search framework,
which is left to future work.
4.2.3 Distribution Convergence
A natural question is whether the stationary distribution  is also the limit distribution of
the process. In other words, from an arbitrary initial state distribution 0 2 , whether T will
eventually converge to the unique stationary distribution  on the path of equilibrium. In a
discrete time model with time length , since a worker's state ! (T) follows a Markov process
with nite state space 

, T converges to its invariant distribution 
 by theorem 11.4 in Stokey,
Lucas and Prescott (1989). Yet in the continuous time model, the state space 
 is a continuum
and the Markov process can not be described by a transition matrix. Hence, the contraction
mapping argument in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) can not be directly applied here. The
following Proposition shows that from any initial distribution 0 2 , the market equilibrium
leads T to the unique stationary wage distribution .
Proposition 6. For any  > 0, let k 2 N and T = k, then T converge to  in the total
variation norm as k goes to innity.
27Since the Proposition 5 holds for any T 2 (
), the wage distribution Gk
w also converges
to the stationary wage distribution G
w in the total variation norm.
5 Extensions
Additional Flow Payo. If a match can produce a small and quality-independent 
ow payo
y > 0 as well as the quality-contingent reward, the logic of our model still works. The positive 
ow
payo reduces rms' experimentation cost and therefore extends the duration of experimentation.
This observation implies that the equilibrium within the group wage dispersion may be enhanced as
productivity grows, which is consistent with empirical observations about wage inequality trends.7
Furthermore, one can allow the 
ow payo y(t) to be a stochastic process. The block recursive
properties still hold, but the solution of the social planner's learning problem is described as
a partial dierential equation. One can choose a particular y process such as a deterministic
increasing trend to study the eect of technology improvement on the labor market, and an It^ o
process to study the relation between real business cycles and unemployment dynamics.
Bad News Cases. Assume the match quality independent 
ow payo is y > 0, and y   (1  
0) > b > y    to avoid a trivial case. Suppose the payo structure and learning process are
given as follows: if a match is good, it never generates a negative one payo; if it is bad, it may
generate a unit of loss at a random time with a Poisson arrival rate . In this case, when bad
news is realized, the rm learns that the match is bad and therefore res the worker immediately.
By observing a history with no bad news, a matched rm and worker become more and more
optimistic about their match quality. In this economy, any existing match has a belief  higher
than 0 in equilibrium; thus on-the-job search is not valuable. The equilibrium has only one labor
market with market tightness (u). In the decentralized market, there is only one equilibrium
wage.
Poisson Bandit Cases. In the benchmark model, I assume that a bad match can not generate
any prot, which seems restrictive. What if it can generate one unit of reward with a lower rate
b 2 (0;)? To avoid a trivial case, I assume b < b < 0 + (1   0)b. In other words, a new
match is better than no match, but no match is better than a bad match. Then, given no reward
arriving in [t;t +), the belief at the end of that time period is t+ =
t exp( )
t exp( )+(1 t)exp( b)
by Bayes' rule. Yet, if one reward is realized in [t;t+), the belief about the match quality jumps
up from t to
t+ =
t[1   exp( )]
t[1   exp( )] + (1   t)[1   exp( b)]
;
7Such as Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2009), Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), etc.







 (   b)t(1   t)
t
t+b(1 t)
no reward at t;
one reward at t;
and the probability that more than one reward is realized is O(2), which is negligible when  is
small. By the same logic, one can solve the social planner's optimal stopping belief, and on-the-job
search strategy. Over time, good matches can survive with higher probability than bad ones due
to the dynamics of endogenous separation driven by learning; thus the empirical implications for
job transitions still hold qualitively. When the search friction is small, the wage distribution has
a 
at tail as well. However, the implications are slightly dierent from those in the benchmark
model in the following sense: (1) No match is believed to be good for sure, and therefore the
endogenous separation will not disappear even for the match with long tenure. (2) The arrival of
a reward can increase the belief about match quality; thus it is possible that a belief t 2 (0;1)
appears in equilibrium. Clearly, it is inecient to destroy a match with belief higher than 0,
and therefore, employed workers with belief  > 0 will not search on-the-job under a bilaterally
ecient contract.
Informative Signal. In the benchmark model, the match is modeled as an experience good
whose quality needs to be slowly learned over time. Yet, in some situations, the employer can
extract non-trivial information about the match quality through an interview. Suppose a rm can
draw an informative signal of the match quality and update its belief about the match quality
through an interview before the match is formed. The signal is drawn from a match quality
dependent distribution that satises monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), and the updated
posterior ~ 0 2 [0;  0], where 0 < 0 <  0 < 1. In this extension, the social planner will form
a new match only if the updated posterior ~ 0 is higher than a cuto level that depends on the
worker's current state. For an unemployed worker, this cuto is the stopping time belief . For
an employed worker, this cuto is the belief t about the worker's current match quality. Let
Pr(~ 0 > t) be the ex ante probability that the posterior is larger than the worker's current belief.
Hence, the on-the-job search policy is determined by
max

p()Pr(~ 0 > t)fE[S(~ 0)j~ 0 > t]   S(t)g   k:
It is clear that both Pr(~ 0 > t) and E[S(~ 0)j~ 0 > t]   S(t) are non-increasing in t; thus the
optimal policy () is non-increasing in , which is similar to that in the benchmark model. Hence
the empirical implications for workers' turnover and the stationary wage distribution predicted by
the benchmark model are qualitively preserved.
Costly On-the-Job Search. Suppose workers' on-the-job search requires a 
ow cost . To
avoid a trivial case where on-the-job search is always suboptimal, I assume  is small enough. Since
29the gain from on-the-job search maxfp()[S(0) S()] kg is increasing in the job replacement
premium, [S(0)   S()], for small enough , there exists a cut-o belief  such that
max





p()[S(0)   S()]   k >  if  < 
:
In other words, matched workers would search on-the-job only if they believed the match quality is
low enough. When  < , the social planner's problem is unchanged, and therefore it is obvious
that introducing costly on-the-job search does not change the main result but reduces the social
surplus S() for each  and therefore shortens the duration of experimentation.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of learning in a frictional labor market and studies the macroe-
conomic consequences of individual learning behavior between matched rms and workers. The
match quality of a worker-rm pair is ex ante homogeneous but unknown. Over time, a matched
worker gradually learns the match quality of his current job. Because of the diversity of individual
histories, a heterogeneity arises among employed workers, which results in dierent on-the-job
search behavior. I show that this learning can produce (1) interesting dynamics of workers' job
transition and (2) wage dispersion among seemingly identical workers.
The implications are consistent with the stylized empirical evidence. The analysis shows that
(1) the separation rate as a function of tenure is increasing rst, decreasing later, and constant
in the end; (2) the on-the-job search probability as a function of tenure is decreasing rst and
constant in the end; (3) when search frictions are small, the wage distribution has a 
at tail as
predicted by the empirical literature; and (4) in an extension, the model can generate a rise in
wage inequality with an improvement in aggregate productivity. The contribution of this paper
is to shed light on the aggregate consequences of individual learning in a tractable model and
identify another source of wage dispersion with a 
at tail. For future research, I believe it would
be interesting to empirically evaluate the impact of learning on wage dispersion.
30A Appendix: Proofs of Results on the Planner's Problem
A.1 Separability of Planner's Problem
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is basically similar to that of theorem 1 in Menzio and Shi (2011). First, given
 > 0, let C() be the space of bounded continuous functions R :  ! R with the sup norm,
jjRjj = sup2 R(). Dene bounded function f : 
R+[;1] ! R, where given ;z, f(;z;!)
is the expected 





(1   p())b + p()0
(1   z) + zb
(1   z)[(1   p()) + p()0] + zb
if ! = u;
if ! = 1;
if ! 2 B=f1g:
For ! 2 
=(B [fug), f(;z;!) = 0 for any (;z). Then the aggregated 




Dene the operator T











s.t. (5   8:) and z : 
 ! [;1],  : 
 ! R
+:
Since the maximand is bounded in [0;=r)], T
R is bounded; Dene   such that k = p0( )=r.
The job replacement benet is bounded by =r. Then (13) and ((14) imply that the optimal
(!)    for any !, and therefore one can replace the constraint that  : 
 ! R+ in (A.1) by
 : 
 ! [0;  ] without loss of any generality.
For each R 2 C() and  2 , the maximand in (A.1) is continuous in (z;) and the set of
feasible choices for (z;) 2 [;1][0;  ] is compact. Hence, the maximum is attained. Since the
maximand is continuous, it follows from the Theorem of Maximum that T
R is continuous. Hence,
T
 : C() ! C(). By Blackwell sucient conditions for a contraction mapping, the solution of
(A.1) is essentially unique. Since lim
n!1e n(r)R = 0, R = U
 solves the social planner's problem
for each  > 0.
Given a particular  2 , let C0()  C() be the set of functions R :  ! R that are
bounded, continuous and linear in the measure of unemployed workers, (u), the measure of
successful matches, (1), and the pdf of existing uncertain matches (). In other words, if
R 2 C0(), there exists Ru;R1 2 R and Re : (0;0] ! R such that




31Consider an arbitrary function R 2 C0(). After substituting the constraints into the maxi-
mand of (A.1) and changing the order of integrals and maximization,8 I have
(T





~ Re() = max
(;z)2[0; ][;1]
z[b + e
 rRu] + (1   z)f[1   p()][1 + e
 rR1] (A.3)








~ Ru = max
2[0; ]
f k + [1   p()][b + e
 rRu] (A.4)
+p()f0[1 + e




~ R1 = max
(;z)2[0; ][;1]
z[b + e
 rRu] + (1   z)f[1   p()][1 + e
 rR1] (A.5)
+[1   p()](1   )e
 rR1] (A.6)
+p()0[1 + e




The denition of R and (A.2) imply that T
 : C0() ! C0(). Moreover;C0() is a closed subset
of C(), thus U
 2 C0().
Let C00()  C0() be the set of functions R :  ! R such that Re is non-decreasing in . Since
TR 2 C0(), the maximand in (A.4) is non-decreasing in . Hence T : C00() ! C00(). Since
C00 () is a closed subset of C0(), U
 2 C00(). Let C000() be the set of functions R :  ! R
such that Re is strictly increasing in . I need to show that Re() is strictly increasing in .
The diculty is that it is hard to apply a xed point theorem in C000() which is not a closed
set. Yet, I will show that any xed point in C00() must belong to C000() in this problem. Let
Re be non-decreasing in , then the maximand in (A.4) is strictly increasing due to the fact that
[1 + e rR(1)   R(+)] > 0. Hence, if U
 2 C00(), it must be the case that U
 2 C000().
It follows that the policy correspondences (z
 ;
 ) solve the maximization problem (A.3-A.5)
for (Re;Ru;R1) = (S();S (u);S(1)). Since the maximand and the constraints in (A.3-A.5) do
not depend on the economy state , (
 ;z












1 are given by (10-12). 
8A pointwise optimization result solves the intergration optimization with measure 1.
32A.2 The Planner's Individual Problem in Continuous Time Limit
The Planner's Individual Control Problem in Continuous Time
A history for a particular worker is dened as f(yT;mT)gT0 2 (f0;1;bgR+  R+), where the
stochastic process fyTg documents the history of realized production signal, where yT 2 fb;1;0g
for any T 2 N, and mT denotes the starting time of the current match to trace both EE and UE
transitions. Denote fFTgT0 as the ltration generated by f(yT;mT)gT0. Let T;d denote the
control, and stopping time, which are both FT adapted. Let hT = (yT0;mT0)gT
T0=0 be a possible
history of a particular worker until calendar time T.













where  = 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ^ d, 1 stands for the stopping time at which a good signal of the current
match is sent, 2 is the stopping time when the worker nds a new job, 3 is the stopping time of
exogenous separation, and d stands for the stopping time when the current match is destroyed
endogenously.
Without loss of any generality, we can focus on Markov control, where the state variable ! (T)
is FT adapted. And ! (T) evolves as follows: (1) ! (T) 2 
, (2) ! jumps to 0 with rate p(T),
(3) it jumps to 1 with rate  only if y 6= b and the current match is good, (4) it jumps to u with
rate  when yT 6= b, and (5) if yT 6= b, d! (T) =  ! (T)(1   ! (T))dT. Since T is FT adapted,
! (T) is a well-dened stochastic process, and FT adapted.
Given a control (!) and a cuto belief to destroy the current match d 2 [0;1] such that












The problem is, for each ! 2 
, to nd the value function S(!), an optimal separation belief




where A denotes all admissible controls such that FT-adapted processes, positive value and (!) 2
L2(
;R+). 
33Proof of Proposition 1




of bounded continuous functions S : 
 ! R with the sup norm, as (A.3,A.4,A.5), and it is
equivalent to an optimal control combined stopping time problem (A.9). By denition of a xed
point, ( ^ T

S)(!) = S(!).
I want to show that [(); (u);
 ] ! [();(u);] and S(!) uniformly converge to
S(!) as  goes to zero, where S(!),();(u); satisfying Proposition 1. In particular,
jjS
   Sjj = jj ^ T

S
   ^ T

S + ^ T

S   Sjj
 (1   r)jjS
   Sjj + jj ^ T

S   Sjj;
where jj:jj is the sup-norm on B [ fug, and the inequality comes from the Blackwell discount
theorem and triangle inequality. Hence
jjS



















f k + [1   p()][b + e
 rS (u)]
+p()f0[1 + e









 rS (u)] + (1   z)f k + [1   p()][1 + e
 rS(1)]











S)(1) = [b + e
 rS (u)] + (1   )f + e
 rS(1)g;






if  2 B, and  < ^ 
 ;
if  2 B, and   ^ 
 ;
where ^  2 (0;0], and ^  such that
k = p
0(^ 
 (u))f0[1 + e
 rS(1)] + (1   0)e
 rS(
+










 rS(1)]   (1   )e
 rS(
+)g;
when  2 B=f1g, and ^ (1) = 0.
The dierentiability of S() implies that S(+) = S() + S0()[+   ] + O(2) for all
 2 [;0]. Multiplying both sides of equations (16,18,19,20) by , and adding (1 r)S(!) for
each ! 2 B [ u, one obtains
S (u) = b + p((u))[S(0)   S (u)]   k(u) + (1   r)S (u);
S() =  + (S(1)   S())   (1   )S
0
+(S (u)   S()) + p(())[S(0)   S()]   k()
(1   r)S();
S(1) =  + [S (u)   S(1)] + (1   r)S(1):
Hence, on B [ fug, ^ T

S   S is well-dened.
Since (A.10,A.11) are continuous in , e r   (1   r) = O(), and p() is single-value and
continuous, lim!0 jj^    jj = 0. And therefore
[1   p()][1 + e








goes to S(), and b+e rS (u) goes to S (u) when  goes to zero. Hence lim!0 jj^ 
  jj = 0,
and therefore for ! 2 (






 (!))   p()][S(0)   S(!)]   k(^ 
 (!)   (!)) + O()
= p
0((!))[S(0)   S(!)   k](^ 
 (!)   (!)) + O():









 = O() for ! 2 
. Since the convergence is independent of the path, the
S uniformly converges to S, and therefore (;z
 ) uniformly converges to (;z). 
35A.3 Solution Characterization of Planner's Problem in Continuous
Time Limit
Proof of Lemma 4
Existence and Uniqueness. Given any S (u) 2 [b
r; 
r], from (16,18,19,20), there exists a unique
solution S() such that




where h(;S()) is the right-hand side of (20) divided by r.
And (u) = argmaxfp()[S(0)   S()]   kg. For an unemployed worker,
rS (u) = b + max

fp()[S(0)   S (u)]   kg;
or
S (u) =
b + p((u))S(0)   k(u)
r + p((u))
: (A.13)







Combining (A.12) and (A.13) yields
S() =






Dene an operator T p : C[0;0] ! C[0;0] where S() 2 C[0;0] is any bounded continuous




 h(x;S(x))dx where S such that (A.12)
and (A.13). To prove the uniqueness of S(!), one needs to verify whether T p is a contraction
mapping. For the second part of T pS, by the standard contraction mapping argument of the





 h(x;S(x))dx satises the Blackwell sucient condition. Moving to the
rst part, T
1
p, one needs to check whether the Blackwell sucient condition holds.
Let S1 > S2, then S (ujS1 (0)) > S (ujS2(0) following (A.14); thus the monotonicity of T
1
p
is proved. Move to the discounting property. Let n 2 R+, and S3 = S1 + n. Following (A.14),
dS(ujS(0))
dS(0) < 1 for all S (0) 2 [S1 (0);S1 (0) + n]; thus the discounting property of T
1
p holds.




p satises the Blackwell sucient condition, and therefore it is a contraction
mapping on a complete functional space, C[0;0]. There exists a unique solution S() such that
S() = T pS(), and S (u) is also determined uniquely!
36Convexity. Consider two 1;2 such that (1) 1;2 2 B (0), (2)  < 2 < 1  0. Let
 = 2 + (1   )1 where  2 (0;1). I want to show that for all 1;2 and , S() 
S(2) + (1   )S(1). Denote () as the path of optimal on-the-job search starting from 
during the current match. Denote by Sg() the expected surplus from an arbitrary path of on-
the-job search  conditional on the true match quality being good and similarly for Sb(). Then
S() = Sg() + (1   )Sb(). And it holds that
S(1)  1S
g(





) + (1   2)S
b(
);
since  is a feasible price path. Hence
S(2) + (1   )S(1) 
(
[1Sg() + (1   1)Sb()]
+(1   )[2Sg() + (1   2)Sb()]
)
= (1 + (1   )2)S
g(
)





) + (1   )S
b(
) = S();
which contradicts the fact that the solution of the HJB function maximizes the planner's individual
worker problem. This proves the claim.
Monotonicity. Since S00  0, and S0() = 0, thus S0  0 for all  2 [;0]. There
are two cases. The rst one is S0 = 0 for all  2 [;0], which implies that  = 0. The
second one is that S0 > 0 for all  2 (;0]. The optimal on-the-job search decision satises






since S(0)   S() > 0 for any  < 0, p00 < 0, I have 0() < 0. p0;p00 and S(0)   S() is
bounded. When  goes to , S0() goes to zero, and therefore 0 goes to zero. 
37B Appendix: Proofs of Results on the Market Mechanism
B.1 Decentralization
Proof of Proposition 2






 (u;)] + (1   z)f[1   p()][1 + e
 rM
(1;)] (B.1)
+[1   p()](1   )e
 rM
(







0 ;)]   kg;
M
 (u;) = max











where + =  + (1   ).
One can nd that S() and S (u) uniquely solves the above problem since (B.1,B.2) are
equivalent to (10,11), and therefore S(1) = M(1;). Hence, the equilibrium joint value
M(!;) = S(!), and the equilibrium job search and job separation strategy equals 
 and
z
 , and therefore the equilibrium is ecient.
Proof of Proposition 3




M(0jC)   x s.t. V (0jC)  x;
where M(jC) is the joint value of the match given the contract C. Given the binding constraint
V (0jC) = x, the prot-maximizing contract C will achieve the joint value M(0) = M(0jC),
by setting an optimal separation rule, on-the-job search strategy given by Proposition 1 and wage
w = W(x) such that V (0jC) = x.
The monotonicity of W(x) can be proved by contradiction. Suppose in equilibrium w1 > w2
such that V (0jw1;;) = V (0jw2;;). Since the bilaterally ecient contract ensures both
workers' on-the-job search and rms' stopping time decision are socially optimal. Two contracts
induce the same history and stopping time. Yet, the expected cost of experimentation is dierent
since E
R 
0 e rtw1dt   E
R 
0 e rtw2dt > 0. Thus no rm will choose w1. 
38B.2 Stationary Distribution
Proof of Proposition 4
The stationary distribution can be calculated by making the in
ow equal out
ow at any ! 2 
.
The density at  is zero since the Markov process is right continuous with respect to calendar
time. For interior point , the only in
ow comes from match with belief 0 >  that survives but
has not sent an good signal, while the out
ow is (). In the steady state, T1() = T2() = ()




() = [ +  + p(())](); (B.3)
where () is the probability density at .
At 0, the in
ow comes from matched and unemployed workers who successfully nd a new
job; out
ow is (0), in the steady state, T1(0) = T2(0) for any T1;T2  0, and thus I have
Z 0

p(())()d + p((u)) = (0); (B.4)
where  is the measure of u-workers. Both the left-hand side and right-hand side of (B.4) are nite,
and therefore there is no mass point at 0.
For unemployed workers, the in
ow comes from the separation of an existing match, while the
out
ow is the measure of unemployed workers who nd a job. Letting in
ow equal out
ow, I have
p((u)) =  +
Z 0

()d + u; (B.5)
where u is the density of workers who have just been red,  is the measure of 1-workers.




[p(() + ]()d + u + : (B.6)
For a successful match, the in
ow comes from a new good signal sent by an existing uncertain
match, and the out









Given the equilibrium ();, and matching function p(), one can obtain a general solution
of the ODE (B.3), which is given by






s +  + p((s))
s(1   s)
ds]; (B.8)
39where 1= ~ A is a constant positive number to ensure  > 0. To x A, one needs to use a boundary
condition implied by the fact that  is a density function and ; are the probability. The condition
is given by Z 0

()d = 1      : (B.9)
Plugging (B.5) and (B.7) into (B.9) yields
Z 0

()d = 1  
R 0












s(1 s) ds], and  ~ A() = ()= ~ A. Then the ~ A = A satisfying the boundary











Given the solution (), (0), u = lim! () = 1=A, and ; can be solved by (B.5) and
(B.7). Since (29) and (31) uniquely pin down , the stationary distribution is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 5






 (s)p((s))ds is the mass of leaving for a new job,
R 0
 (s)ds is the mass of
unemployed workers due to a job destruction shock, and u is the mass of leaving due to ring. The
in
ow is the measure of new jobs formed with wage w, which is ((wnew) 1(w))p((wnew) 1(w)). A
worker with state ! = (wnew) 1(w) is looking for a new job in the submarket where the promised





 (s)[p((s)) + ]ds + u] = ((wnew) 1(w))p((wnew) 1(w)). Since u = 1=A,
gw(w) =
((wnew) 1(w))p((wnew) 1(w)) R 0
 (s)[p((s))+]ds+1=A . For w = w, only unemployed workers are looking for a job
with this wage. A similar logic can derive the expression of gu
w. Since wnew is strictly monotone
and continuous, (w;  w) is connected. Since S (u) = S(), wnew(u) = lim! wnew().
Proof of Proposition 6
For a xed  > 0, an articial discrete time Markov process is constructed. The equilibrium
strategy implies that, from any initial prior 0 2 , T(
=
) = 0 after time t, and no mass point
for ! 2 [;0]. It is easy to verify that the process satises Doeblin's condition (see Stokey, Lucas
and Prescott, 1989, chapter 11) after time t. By Theorem 11.10 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott
(1989), the invariant distribution  is unique, and k converges to  in the total variation
40norm as k 2 N goes to innity. Clearly, the invariant distribution of the continuous time Markov
process, , is also the invariant distribution of the articial discrete time Markov process; thus,
 =  and therefore k strongly converges to  as k 2 N goes to innity.
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